Curious Femme

Europe has spent decades talking about “strategic autonomy” as if it were a branding exercise. In 2026, it is closer to a stress test. Not because America has vanished overnight, but because the assumption of automatic, reliable US leadership has become politically contingent. That single shift forces a hard question.

If Europe had to defend itself tonight, could it?

The most honest answer is that Europe could fight, but it could not fight the way NATO has been designed to fight for the last 75 years, at least not at scale, not quickly, and not without accepting serious operational risk. The core problem is not courage or competence, it is dependence on US enabled warfighting systems.

Why this debate has accelerated

You do not need to agree with every rhetorical flourish coming out of Davos to see the strategic consequence. Public disputes, fact checks, and diplomatic rows function as signals, they change what allies believe is possible, and therefore what adversaries may choose to test.

In January 2026, several outlets fact-checked claims made in Donald Trump’s Davos speech about NATO and Greenland, highlighting false or misleading assertions. Even if the detail is corrected, the broader effect remains: Europe is being pushed to plan as if US backing is no longer guaranteed.

The UK fallout over remarks about NATO forces in Afghanistan shows the same dynamic. This is not only about offence, it is about alliance credibility and the political durability of shared sacrifice narratives.

The uncomfortable truth, Europe has armies, but not enough of the enablers

Europe’s forces are real. They have high-end platforms, experienced personnel, and in some areas world-class capability. The problem is that modern high-intensity war is not won by platforms alone. It is won by systems: sensing, deciding, moving, sustaining, and striking, continuously, at pace.

Across the major studies you cited, the recurring shortfalls are strikingly consistent:

• Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, including space enabled services and targeting pipelines
• Command and control architecture at theatre scale
• Strategic lift and air mobility
• Air-to-air refuelling
• Integrated air and missile defence
• Munitions stockpiles and industrial surge capacity

Wavell Room frames this in plain terms: Europe faces crippling shortfalls in ammunition and critical assets, which would be decisive in a peer conflict. The IISS work goes further, modelling the costs and industrial implications of replacing US contributions under a scenario in which the US begins to withdraw equipment, stocks, and support structures.

So when someone says “Europe spends enough, it just wastes it”, they are partly right and partly wrong. Fragmentation matters, but there are also genuine capacity gaps that money alone cannot fill quickly.

Money is not the only constraint, coordination is the choke point

Bruegel’s analysis with the Kiel Institute, reported by Reuters and published by Bruegel, puts a headline number on what “doing without the US” might require: roughly €250 billion per year in additional defence investment and around 300,000 more soldiers, alongside equipment increases. Their key point is not only affordability, it is that Europe needs far more coordination and joint procurement to translate spending into capability.

This is the part many commentators skip. A Europe that tries to solve this with 27 national shopping lists will pay more and get less. Standardisation, pooled maintenance, shared training pipelines, and common procurement matter because they are the difference between a collection of forces and a functioning warfighting machine.

“Fight tonight” versus “deter by 2030”, these are different tests

There are two timelines here, and they get muddled deliberately in public debate.

Fight tonight is about readiness, stockpiles, command structures, and the ability to sustain operations for weeks and months. On that measure, Europe still leans heavily on the US.

Deter by 2030 is about whether Europe can build a credible, autonomous pillar over the next five years, in funding, industry, mobilisation, and governance.

The EU’s ReArm Europe Plan, also presented as Readiness 2030, is a clear attempt to move from slogans to instruments: fiscal flexibility, a €150 billion loan facility for joint procurement, and a wider mobilisation plan aiming to leverage up to €800 billion.

The Guardian’s reporting on the EU loan programme captured the political intent: boost capacity by 2030, reduce reliance on US supply, and shift procurement toward European and partner suppliers.

Whether this becomes a coherent deterrent posture depends on implementation, not announcements.

The NATO spending story is necessary, but not sufficient

Defence spending has risen sharply since 2022, and NATO itself has emphasised the 2 per cent guideline and the equipment spending guideline.

But the numbers hide a deeper issue. NATO’s own data shows spending levels, yet spending does not automatically generate deployable brigades, integrated air defence, or munitions depth. Reuters reporting on NATO’s internal debates has repeatedly made the same point, that spending targets are rising, and that only a few states are currently exceeding the higher thresholds being discussed, but capability output is what matters.

The UK’s own official statistical bulletin notes the UK’s defence spending as a share of GDP and its position among NATO members meeting the guideline. That is important context, but it does not answer the European question, which is not only what we spend, but whether we can fight as a system without US enabled components.

A harsher, more realistic framing, what would Europe have to replace?

If the US stepped back sharply, Europe would need to replace three layers of American contribution.

Operational enablers, including ISR, refuelling, lift, and aspects of integrated air and missile defence.

Industrial depth, the ability to produce and replenish munitions and key platforms at scale.

Political command gravity, the less visible but decisive role the US plays in aligning allies, compressing decision cycles, and providing escalation management.

The IISS research paper is valuable because it refuses comforting abstractions. It treats the gap as a concrete set of capabilities and costs, and it highlights industrial requirements, not just procurement wish lists.

What the “Europe after America” argument gets right

The IAI piece you shared makes a different but essential contribution: it frames US unreliability as structural rather than cyclical, and argues Europe should stop behaving as if the only goal is to restore the old bargain. It advocates pairing defence capability building with economic leverage and supply chain strategy.

That matters because defence autonomy is not only tanks and missiles. It is also microelectronics, space services, energy resilience, and secure production chains. Industrial policy becomes defence policy.

The UK problem, stuck between NATO dependence and EU procurement gravity

The UK remains one of Europe’s key military actors, but it is outside the EU’s defence procurement framework unless specific partnerships are negotiated. The EU’s loan and procurement direction, including the preference toward EU, Norway, and Ukraine suppliers in some mechanisms, raises strategic questions for Britain: whether it integrates, competes, or free rides.

If we want a serious debate in the UK, we should stop pretending this is about pride and start asking a practical question.

Do we want Britain to be a central architect of Europe’s self defence pillar, or a spectator hoping the US will remain emotionally attached to Europe?

So, can Europe defend itself without America

Europe can afford more defence, and it is beginning to build instruments to do so. But Europe cannot instantly replace the US role in NATO’s warfighting system, and pretending otherwise is a dangerous form of optimism.

The most responsible position is not panic and it is not denial. It is conditional realism.

Europe can become far more autonomous within a decade if it treats this as a systems engineering problem, not a political performance. It must prioritise enablers, scale stockpiles, and force genuine procurement integration. The question is not whether Europe has the money. It is whether it has the discipline.

Reference list

European Commission (2026) ‘Commission approves first wave of defence funding for eight projects’.

European Commission (2025) ‘Future of European defence, ReArm Europe plan, Readiness 2030’.

European Parliamentary Research Service (2025) ReArm Europe Plan, Readiness 2030.

Guardian (2025) ‘As real as it can get, EU to loan €150bn for European defence from invasion’.

International Institute for Strategic Studies (2025) Defending Europe Without the United States, Costs and Consequences.

International Institute for Strategic Studies (2025) ‘Europe’s air of dependence’.

Morari, B. (2026) Europe after America, A Survival Guide for Moving on. IAI Commentaries.

NATO (2025) Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2025).

NATO (2025) ‘Funding NATO, Defence Investment Pledge’.

Reuters (2025) ‘Europe can afford to defend itself without US but needs more coordination, study says’.

Reuters (2025) ‘All NATO members hit old spending target, only three meet new goal’.

Reuters (2025) ‘NATO’s Rutte calls for quantum leap as Europe boosts defence investment’.

TIME (2026) ‘Fact Checking Donald Trump’s Speech at Davos’.

Wavell Room (2025) ‘What if Europe had to fight tonight, without the Americans?